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OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 After the District Court denied Plaintiffs’ motion 
to remand this case to New Jersey state court, we granted 
their petition for an interlocutory appeal.  The issue 
before us is whether there is federal-question jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, which allege that 
defendants manipulated the price of a stock via abusive 
“naked” short sales.  Short sales are subject to detailed 
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federal regulation under Regulation SHO.  New Jersey 
does not have an analogous provision.  However, the 
question of whether the naked short selling at issue in 
this case violates New Jersey law (including the state’s 
general securities fraud provisions) need not be answered 
by reference to Regulation SHO.  Because the success of 
Plaintiffs’ state-law causes of action does not 
“necessarily” depend upon the contents of federal law, 
this case does not “arise under” the laws of the United 
States.  The presence of an exclusive jurisdiction 
provision governing Regulation SHO does not change the 
analysis, as such provisions cannot independently 
generate jurisdiction. 
 We hold that there is no federal-question 
jurisdiction over this suit.  Accordingly, we will reverse 
the order denying remand, and direct the District Court to 
remand this case to the Superior Court of New Jersey. 
I. 
 Plaintiffs are shareholders in Escala Group, Inc. 
(“Escala”).  Named Defendants are financial institutions 
that engage in equity trading.  Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit 
in the Superior Court of New Jersey alleging that 
Defendants participated in “naked” short selling of 
Escala stock, which “increased the pool of tradable 
shares by electronically manufacturing fictitious and 
unauthorized phantom shares.”  (Am. Compl. ¶ 4.)  
Plaintiffs also refer to these shares as “counterfeit.”  (Am. 
7 
 
Compl. ¶ 37.)  Plaintiffs claim that this alleged increase 
in Escala shares diluted their voting rights and caused 
their shares to decline in value.  The Amended Complaint 
pleads ten causes of action, with all claims asserted under 
New Jersey law.  These causes of action address: (i) 
claims under the New Jersey Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act based on predicate 
acts of New Jersey securities fraud and theft; and (ii) 
common law claims for unjust enrichment, interference 
with economic advantage and contractual relations, 
breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, and negligence. 
 A normal (i.e., non-naked) short sale is usually 
accomplished in six steps:  (1) “[t]he short seller 
identifies securities she believes will drop in market 
price;” (2) arranges to “borrow[] these securities from a 
broker;”  (3) “sells the borrowed securities on the open 
market;”  (4)  waits some period of time hoping the 
securities decline in value; (5) “purchases replacement 
securities on the open market;” and (6) “returns them to 
the broker—thereby closing the short seller’s position.”  
Elec. Trading Grp., LLC v. Banc of Am. Sec. LLC, 588 
F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 2009).  “The short seller’s profit 
(if any) is the difference between the market price at 
which she sold the borrowed securities and the market 
price at which she purchased the replacement securities, 
less [transaction costs].”  Id.  Usually a buyer takes 
delivery of the borrowed securities within three days 
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following the purchase.  Amendments to Regulation 
SHO, SEC Release No. 34-58773, 73 Fed Reg. 61706, 
61707 n.8 (Oct. 14, 2008).   
 However, “[i]n a ‘naked’ short sale . . . the short 
seller does not borrow securities in time to make delivery 
to the buyer within the standard three-day settlement 
period.  As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to 
the buyer when delivery is due (known as a ‘fail’ or ‘fail 
to deliver’).  Sellers sometimes intentionally fail to 
deliver securities as part of a scheme to manipulate the 
price of a security, or possibly to avoid borrowing costs 
associated with short sales, especially when the costs of 
borrowing stock are high.”  Id. at 707-08.  Naked short 
selling is not per se illegal under federal law.  However, 
some naked short selling schemes may run afoul of 
federal antifraud laws, as well as Regulation SHO.  
‘Naked’ Short Selling Antifraud Rule, SEC Release No. 
34-58774, 73 Fed. Reg. 61666, 61667 (Oct. 14, 2008).  
 Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 et seq., was 
adopted in 2004 by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), pursuant to its 
authority under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(“Exchange Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.  See Short 
Sales, SEC Release No. 34-50103, 69 Fed. Reg. 48008 
(July 28, 2004).  Among other restrictions, Regulation 
SHO imposes “locate” and “close out” requirements on 
broker-dealers in an attempt to minimize fails to deliver.  
Under the locate requirement, before executing a short 
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sale order, a broker-dealer must have “reasonable 
grounds” to believe that the security can be borrowed and 
delivered within three days.  17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(1).  
If a fail to deliver has occurred and persists for thirteen 
days, under the “close out” requirement broker-dealers 
may be required to purchase and deliver securities “of 
like kind and quantity.”  17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(3); Elec. 
Trading Grp., 588 F.3d at 135-36. 
 Although Plaintiffs’ causes of action are all 
brought under state law, the Amended Complaint 
repeatedly mentions the requirements of Regulation 
SHO, its background, and enforcement actions taken 
against some Defendants regarding Regulation SHO.  It 
also cites data maintained to assist broker-dealers in 
complying with Regulation SHO’s close out requirement, 
and at times couches its allegations in language that 
appears borrowed from Regulation SHO.    Further, 
plaintiffs plead that “Defendants violated the trading 
rules and regulations requiring that they actually deliver 
shares . . . to settle short sale transactions.”  (Am. Compl. 
¶ 33.)  There is no question that Plaintiffs assert in their 
Amended Complaint, both expressly and by implication, 
that Defendants repeatedly violated federal law.  
Moreover, there is no New Jersey analogue to Regulation 
SHO. 
 Defendants removed the suit from the Superior 
Court of New Jersey to the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, premised on the existence 
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of federal-question jurisdiction.  Plaintiffs sought 
remand.  On December 31, 2012, the Magistrate Judge 
issued a Report and Recommendation suggesting that 
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand be granted:  “because 
[Plaintiffs] may succeed on their New Jersey RICO 
claims . . . and state common law claims . . . without 
establishing liability under federal law, the Amended 
Complaint, on its face, does not raise necessarily a 
substantial issue of federal law.”  Manning v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 12–4466, 2012 WL 
7783142, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 2012).  The District 
Court disagreed in a March 20, 2013 opinion:  “the case 
at bar is premised upon and its resolution depends on the 
alleged violation of a regulation promulgated under the 
[Exchange] Act.”  Manning v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 12–4466, 2013 WL 1164838, 
at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2013). 
 Noting “substantial ground for difference [of 
opinion] here, as evinced by the different outcome 
reached by this Court and [the] Magistrate Judge . . . in 
this case,” on May 23, 2013, the District Court certified 
an interlocutory appeal to this Court, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(b), to answer “the question of whether 
remand is appropriate in this case.”  Manning v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 12–4466, 2013 
WL 2285955, at *2 (D.N.J. May 23, 2013).  On August 
28, 2013, we granted Plaintiffs’ petition to appeal.     
II. 
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 Defendants removed this suit to federal court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting federal 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337 and 15 
U.S.C. § 78aa. We have jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
“We exercise plenary review over [a] district 
court’s order denying [a] motion for remand.”  Werwinski 
v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 665 (3d Cir. 2002). 
III. 
 The sole issue on appeal is whether there is 
federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.  
“The removing party . . . carries a heavy burden of 
showing that at all stages of the litigation the case is 
properly before the federal court.  Removal statutes are to 
be strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved in 
favor of remand.”  Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted).  Defendants point 
to two principal statutory provisions they believe confer 
jurisdiction here:  28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. § 78aa 
(“§ 27” of the Exchange Act).1  Section 1331, the 
“general federal-question statute,” Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 134 S. Ct. 2024, 2030 n.2 (2014), gives 
                                                 
1 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) authorizes removal of “any civil 
action” over which district courts “have original 
jurisdiction.”   
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district courts original jurisdiction over “all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the 
United States.”  Section 27 gives district courts 
“exclusive jurisdiction . . . of all suits in equity and 
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by [the Exchange Act] or the rules and 
regulations thereunder.”   
A. 
 Section 1331 “is invoked by and large by plaintiffs 
pleading a cause of action created by federal law.”  
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & 
Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005);  see also Gunn v. 
Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013) (“Most directly, a 
case arises under federal law when federal law creates the 
cause of action asserted.”) (citing Am. Well Works Co. v. 
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)).  
However, causes of action under state law may 
nonetheless “arise under” federal law for purposes of § 
1331 if the four-pronged Grable test is met.  “[F]ederal 
jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal 
issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) 
substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court 
without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by 
Congress.”  Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065 (applying Grable).  
Only a “slim category” of cases satisfy the Grable test.  
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 
U.S. 677, 701 (2006).  Because we conclude that no 
federal issue has been necessarily raised here, we need 
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not decide whether the other three Grable requirements 
are met. 
 For a federal issue to be necessarily raised, 
“vindication of a right under state law [must] necessarily 
turn[] on some construction of federal law.”  Franchise 
Tax Bd. of State of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983).  Grable presented 
one of the rare instances where a federal issue was 
necessarily raised.  Grable sued under state law to quiet 
title.  Five years prior to the suit, the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”) seized Grable’s land to satisfy a tax 
deficiency.  The IRS then sold that land to the defendant.  
Grable argued that the IRS did so without giving 
sufficient notice as required by federal law.  Because 
“whether Grable was given notice within the meaning of 
the federal statute is . . . an essential element of its quiet 
title claim,” the Supreme Court held that the issue of 
what notice was required under federal law was 
necessarily raised.  Grable, 545 U.S. at 315 (emphasis 
added).   
 The “classic example,” id. at 312, of this type of 
arising under jurisdiction similarly required a 
determination of federal law as an essential element of 
the plaintiff’s state law claim.  In Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), plaintiff sued 
under a state law which forbade the defendant from 
investing in illegal securities.  The alleged source of 
illegality was that the federal bonds purchased by the 
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defendant were unconstitutional (on the theory that 
Congress did not have the power to issue them).  Because 
the “decision depend[ed] upon the determination of [the 
constitutional] issue,” “which [was] directly drawn in 
question,” federal jurisdiction was proper.  Id. at 245-46.    
 By contrast, Regulation SHO is not an element of 
any of Plaintiffs’ claims. The claims, therefore, could be 
decided without reference to federal law.  Plaintiffs 
alleged a market manipulation scheme and sued 
exclusively under New Jersey law, including its common 
law.  The District Court, “noting that Plaintiffs do not 
point to a New Jersey law or regulation which similarly 
prohibits the type of alleged conduct at issue here,” found 
that the claims were necessarily predicated on the 
violation of Regulation SHO.  Manning, 2013 WL 
1164838, at *5.  We conclude it was improper for the 
District Court to foreclose the possibility that particular 
state causes of action could permit recovery solely under 
state law.  It is true that New Jersey’s laws are not as 
robust as federal laws.  But we have previously held that 
even where “[t]here may be some basis to agree with 
defendants that [plaintiffs’] view of the state law is 
incorrect and will be so found[, i]t is . . . for the state 
court to make the determination as to the applicability of 
its state law.”  United Jersey Banks v. Parell, 783 F.2d 
360, 367 (3d Cir. 1986).   
 Indeed, even under federal law, a claim based on 
“abusive ‘naked’ short selling as part of a manipulative 
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scheme,” can be maintained without a predicate violation 
of Regulation SHO, because such schemes are “always 
illegal under the general antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws . . . .”  ‘Naked’ Short Selling 
Antifraud Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 61667.  Such 
manipulative schemes may “drive down a company’s 
stock price” and “undermine the confidence of 
investors,” which may, in turn, make investors more 
“reluctant to commit capital.”  Id. at 61670.    If naked 
short selling can result in a violation of federal general 
antifraud provisions independently of Regulation SHO, it 
is difficult to imagine why naked short selling cannot 
similarly result in a violation of state general antifraud 
provisions independently of Regulation SHO.  Moreover, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, exercising its 
common-law authority over New Jersey’s general 
securities fraud provisions, has not shied away from 
deviating from federal law.  See Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 
165 N.J. 94, 97 (2000) (“Even though the theory of fraud 
on the market has a place in the securities law of this 
nation, it is a stranger to New Jersey’s securities laws.  It 
is also not consistent with the current requirements for a 
common-law action for fraud in New Jersey.”). 
 As we read the Amended Complaint, no causes of 
action are predicated at all on a violation of Regulation 
SHO.  Cf. Lippitt v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 
340 F.3d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 
22, 2003) (no jurisdiction even where the complaint 
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“unnecessarily describes the alleged conduct of the 
defendants in terms that track almost verbatim the 
misdeeds proscribed by [federal law]”).  For example, 
Plaintiffs do not plead a violation of Regulation SHO as a 
predicate violation for purposes of New Jersey RICO.  
Nor, for the reasons above, do we think Plaintiffs’ causes 
of action necessarily need to be predicated on a violation 
of Regulation SHO for Plaintiffs to have a chance at 
recovering under state law.   
 But even if Plaintiffs’ claims were partially 
predicated on federal law, federal law would still not be 
necessarily raised.  See Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 810 (1988) (“[A] claim 
supported by alternative theories in the complaint may 
not form the basis for [federal] jurisdiction unless 
[federal] law is essential to each.”).2  Where “[p]laintiffs’ 
state [law] RICO claims allege both federal and state 
predicate acts,” no federal question is necessarily raised 
because a Plaintiff could “prevail upon their New Jersey 
RICO claims or any of their other state-law claims 
                                                 
2 Although Christianson concerned 28 U.S.C. § 1338 
(dealing with actions “arising under” the patent laws) 
rather than § 1331, the Supreme Court noted the 
“identical language” in the two provisions and applied 
the “same test” to both.  486 U.S. at 808.  See also Gunn, 
133 S. Ct. at 1064-65 (citing Christianson and applying 
the Grable § 1331 analysis to § 1338).   
17 
 
without any need to prove or establish a violation of 
federal law.”  Fairfax Fin. Holdings Ltd. v. S.A.C. 
Capital Mgmt., LLC, No. 06-4197, 2007 WL 1456204, at 
*2-3 (D.N.J. May 15, 2007) (applying Christianson to 
RICO claims premised on manipulative short selling). 
 Defendants also assert jurisdiction under § 1331 on 
the basis of a Frequently Asked Questions (“FAQ”) page 
on the SEC’s website.  The website is clear from the 
outset that the FAQ responses are “not rules, regulations, 
or statements of the [SEC],” nor has the Commission 
approved them.3  This website, which we are told refutes 
Plaintiffs’ theory of damages, says that naked short 
selling does not create “counterfeit shares”—a term 
Plaintiffs employ liberally in the Amended Complaint.  
But the phrase “counterfeit shares” does not appear a 
single time anywhere in the United States Code or the 
Code of Federal Regulations.  Defendants simply cannot 
carry their burden of establishing jurisdiction based on a 
“disputed issue of federal . . . law,” Grable, 545 U.S. at 
310, without identifying a particular source of federal law 
for the judiciary to interpret.     
                                                 
3 Division of Market Regulation:  Responses to 
Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Regulation 
SHO, 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrfaqregsho120
4.htm (last visited October 24, 2014). 
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 Even if Plaintiffs’ theories are factually 
contradicted by actual rules with the force of law, as the 
Eighth Circuit thought similar theories were in Pet 
Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 559 
F.3d 772, 781 (8th Cir. 2009) (referencing National 
Securities Clearance Corporation rules), Defendants 
would at best be entitled to a preemption defense.  
“Federal pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to 
the plaintiff’s suit. As a defense, it does not appear on the 
face of a well-pleaded complaint, and, therefore, does not 
authorize removal to federal court.”  Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, (1987).4 
                                                 
4 The Eighth Circuit in Pet Quarters held that state law 
claims against SEC-registered clearing agencies for 
maintaining a program under rules approved by the SEC 
(which allowed some naked short selling to occur) were 
all conflict preempted.  Although ostensibly recognizing 
the rule that preemption does not usually give rise to 
federal-question jurisdiction, the Eighth Circuit held that 
the Grable test was satisfied as the complaint “presents a 
substantial federal question because it directly implicates 
actions taken by the Commission . . . .”  559 F.3d at 779.  
Although Defendants argue that the identity of the 
defendant is not relevant to the Grable inquiry, were we 
to expand the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Pet Quarters to 
all private defendants anytime a plaintiff’s claim was 
uncomfortably juxtaposed with federal regulations, 
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     Defendants do not purport to cite a single case 
regarding § 1331 (other than Grable and Gunn) in 
support of their contention that a question of federal law 
is necessarily raised here.  Nonetheless, defendants do 
cite D’Alessio v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 258 
F.3d 93, 101-102 (2d Cir. 2001),5 which held that there 
was jurisdiction under § 1331 where a court was 
“require[d] . . . to construe federal securities laws,” 
because the plaintiff alleged that the New York Stock 
Exchange “failed to perform its statutory duty, created 
under federal law, to enforce its members’ compliance 
with those laws.”  The instant case is distinguishable as 
Plaintiffs’ claims could rise or fall entirely based on the 
construction of state law. 
 We conclude that § 1331 does not provide a basis 
to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.   
B. 
                                                                                                             
preemption-like arguments would always create federal-
question jurisdiction.   
5 Defendants contend D’Alessio supports jurisdiction 
under § 27.  But it was plainly decided under § 1331, id. 
at 101, and § 27 was only mentioned in the context of 
what is now prong three of Grable (substantiality) after 
the necessarily raised issue was resolved.  258 F.3d at 
104.  
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 Having concluded that there is no arising under 
jurisdiction here pursuant to § 1331, we must decide 
whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 27 of the 
Exchange Act might nonetheless provide a more 
expansive basis for federal-question jurisdiction.  
Although Defendants, in advancing this argument, 
contend that “every circuit court has reached the same 
conclusion,” Appellees’ Br. 2, the issue has actually split 
the two circuits that have most directly addressed it.  
Compare Barbara v. N. Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 
55 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Our determination that [plaintiff]’s 
state court complaint did not ‘arise under’ federal law 
within the meaning of section 1331 effectively resolves 
our inquiry under section 27 of the Exchange Act as well. 
. . .  We think that [section 27] plainly refers to claims 
created by the Act or by rules promulgated thereunder, 
but not to claims created by state law.”)6 with Cal. ex rel. 
Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 841 (9th Cir. 
2004)7 (“Sparta [Surgical Corp. v. National Association 
of Securities Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998)] 
establishes, however, that the exclusive jurisdiction 
                                                 
6 See also Marel v. LKS Acquisitions, Inc., 585 F.3d 279, 
280-81 (6th Cir. 2009) (“As the controversy in this case . 
. . was one to enforce a state law claim, this grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction [in § 27] does not apply.  See 
Barbara.”). 
7 Opinion amended on other grounds on denial of 
rehearing, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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provision takes the case outside of the rule . . . which 
otherwise might bar the action if the only jurisdictional 
provision implicated were [section] 1331. . . . [In Sparta] 
there would have been no jurisdiction predicated solely 
on [section] 1331. Yet the claim lay ‘not under [section] 
1331, but under [section 27].’”) (internal citations 
omitted).  The Second Circuit recently acknowledged this 
split in NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc. v. UBS Sec., LLC, No. 
13-2657, 2014 WL 5486457, at *17 (2d Cir. Oct. 31, 
2014).8 
 We believe the Supreme Court all but answered 
this question in Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. 
Superior Court of Delaware In & For New Castle 
County, 366 U.S. 656 (1961).  There, the Supreme Court 
considered an exclusive jurisdiction provision 
                                                 
8 In an “odd[] . . . discuss[ion],” id. at *33 (Straub, J. 
dissenting), on substantially different facts than at issue 
here, the Second Circuit considered Sparta and similar 
decisions relevant to its analysis of the fourth prong of 
Grable (whether exercising jurisdiction under § 1331 
would upset the federal-state balance of judicial 
responsibilities).  Specifically, that court declared that 
exercising jurisdiction under § 1331 would not upset the 
federal-state balance given that jurisdiction could be 
exercised in other circuits under § 27, even though it 
acknowledged that its own decision in Barbara “declined 
to adopt such a broad reading of [§ 27]”—a decision it 
was not revisiting.  Id. at *17. 
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substantially identical to § 27 of the Exchange Act:  § 22 
of the Natural Gas Act.  Cf. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 
455, 471 (1990) (noting similarities in the specific 
language used in § 22 of the Natural Gas Act and § 27 of 
the Exchange Act, in contrast to other “governing 
statutes” “[i]n the standard fields of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction”).  “[In § 22 of the Natural Gas Act, 
‘e]xclusive jurisdiction’ is given the federal courts but it 
is ‘exclusive’ only for suits that may be brought in the 
federal courts. Exclusiveness is a consequence of having 
jurisdiction, not the generator of jurisdiction because of 
which state courts are excluded.”  Pan Am., 366 U.S at 
664.  We see no reason to treat the two provisions 
differently.     
 Accordingly, we disagree with the line of Ninth 
Circuit cases which have held that there can be 
jurisdiction under § 27 (and other exclusive jurisdiction 
provisions) even when there is not under § 1331.9  We 
note that the Ninth Circuit in its seminal decision in 
Sparta did not consider the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Pan American.  The incongruity between Sparta and Pan 
                                                 
9 Hawkins v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers Inc., 
149 F.3d 330, 331-32 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), 
although not as explicit as Sparta and Dynegy, could be 
read as holding that § 27 can provide subject-matter 
jurisdiction independently of § 1331.  To the extent 
Hawkins so holds, we disagree with it. 
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American was brought squarely before the Ninth Circuit 
in Dynegy.  At issue in Dynegy was the import of § 317 
of the Federal Power Act—an exclusive jurisdiction 
provision substantially identical to both § 27 (which was 
at issue in Sparta) and § 22 (which was at issue in Pan 
American).   Although the Ninth Circuit, in a footnote, 
acknowledged that Pan American made clear that such 
provisions were not “‘generator[s] of jurisdiction,’” it 
nonetheless “fe[lt] bound . . . by Sparta’s subsequent 
interpretation.”10  Dynegy, 375 F.3d at 843, n.10.  We are 
                                                 
10 Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged in that 
footnote that the Supreme Court’s holding in Pan 
American actually meant something relevant, the text of 
its opinion belies that admission:  “The Pan American 
court’s holding is unremarkable insofar as it held that 
cases falling outside the scope of the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision are not subject to it.”  Dynegy, 375 
F.3d 831 at 843.  In reality, Pan American stands for the 
proposition that cases otherwise falling outside the scope 
of the district courts’ original jurisdiction are not brought 
within it by virtue of an exclusive jurisdiction provision.  
See In re W. States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust 
Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1130 (D. Nev. 2004).  Such 
is the doctrinal disarray created by Dynegy and Sparta, 
that a district court “reluctant[ly] . . . conclu[ded]” that it 
could not follow the Supreme Court’s holding in Pan 
American even with respect to § 22 of the Natural Gas 
Act—the very provision at issue in Pan American.  See 
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not confronted with such a problem, as this Court has 
faithfully applied Pan American to other exclusive 
jurisdiction provisions.  See Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 683 
F.2d 69, 74 (3d Cir. 1982) (applying Pan American to § 
113(b) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act).   
 Although it does not appear that any court has 
expressly relied on Pan American to hold that § 27 does 
not authorize a departure from the Grable line of cases, 
courts have cited Pan American in holding that § 27 does 
not depart from § 1331 in other ways.  See Calvert Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Reinsurance Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 
1231 (7th Cir. 1979) (§ 27 does not prevent state courts 
from hearing Exchange Act defenses); Gold v. Blinder, 
Robinson & Co., 580 F. Supp. 50, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (§ 
27 “does not bar a plaintiff from pursuing at its option 
cognate remedies based entirely upon state law”); 
McMahon Chevrolet, Inc. v. Davis, 392 F. Supp. 322, 
324-25 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (“This Court is of the opinion 
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts under 
[§ 27] is like the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal 
courts under . . . the Natural Gas Act . . . in that such 
                                                                                                             
Pacificorp v. Nw. Pipeline GP, No. 10–99, 2010 WL 
3199950, at *6 n.3 (D. Or. June 23, 2010) report and 
recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3219533 (Aug. 9, 
2010). 
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jurisdiction does not bar a plaintiff from pursuing at his 
option remedies based solely on state law. Pan Am.”). 
 We agree with the Second Circuit’s holding in 
Barbara that § 27 is coextensive with § 1331 for 
purposes of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction—the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision merely serves to divest 
state courts of jurisdiction.11  Accordingly, § 27 does not 
provide an independent basis to exercise jurisdiction over 
Plaintiffs’ claims. 
IV. 
 Having concluded that federal-question 
jurisdiction is lacking, we will reverse the District 
Court’s March 20, 2013 order, and remand with 
instructions that the District Court remand this case to the 
Superior Court of New Jersey. 
 
                                                 
11 The District of New Jersey already reached this 
conclusion in a prior short selling case by relying on 
Barbara.  Fairfax, 2007 WL 1456204, at *5. 
